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Abstract 
This study was designed to investigate the determinants of choice in a 
/ 
low investment situation prior to and after failure at a task. One hundred 
forty-seven subjects were randomly placed in one of four experiaental groups--
subjects know they have a high probability of solving a task; subjects know 
they have a low probability of solving a task; subjects don't know their prob-
ability of solving a task but for one group it is high and for another it i. 
low. Failure at solving a chosen task was induced in all subjects to deter-
mine the effect of failure on the determinants of choice. Subjects were 
questioned as to their need for experimental points--high need operationally 
defined as needing four points or more and low need as needing three points 
or less. On the basis of subjects' need for experimental points each of the 
four major treatment categories was d~v'eded into high and low need subjects 
I ' 
per treatment category. Four-celled chi-square tests on the number of high 
need subjects choosing a task worth 5 points and low need subjects choosing a 
task worth 1 or 2 points per treatment category yielded high significant 
diffe~nces in that high need subjects chose tasks worth 5 points and low need 
subjects chose tasks worth 1 or 2 points, i.e •• need is a significant deter-
minant of choice in a low investment situation. Differences witb respect to 
the knowledge of probability and no knowledge of probability treatments 
yielded marginal significance in that need is a greater detel'llinant of choice 
when probability of success is not known. 1 ••• t need was the sole detenainant 
of choice when probability was given. Chi-square difference. between high 
1 \ • 
and low probability of success treatments did not yield any difference with 
"', '" 
respect to the number of high need subj.c~ -chOOSing a task worth 5 points. 
After failure in solving tasks, chi-~quare tests again yielded significant 
differences between the number of high and low need subjects choosing a task 
worth 5 points. // There was no difference in the probability not given 
treatment with respect to the number of high need subjects choosing task .5 
between the high and low probability condition. However, in the probability 
given treatment condition there was a trend in the direction of fewer high 
need subjects choosing 5 in the low probability condition after failure. 
The conclusions are that need is a significant determinant of choice 
in a low investment situation and that knowledge of the probability of Succe.s 
will also be a determinant of choice. Also, the results suggest a trend in 
the direction of failure at a task to increase the weight given to probabllitJ 
as a determinant of choice. Results of this study are in essential agree_nt 
with those of previous studies. 
Devaluation of a Desired Object 
As a Function of Expectancy: 
A Refutation of Dissonance / 
Richard R. Izzett 
Loyola University 
Concerning theories of motivation there are two questions which must 
be answered. One is to account for an individual's choice of one alter-
native among a set of alternatives'and the second is to account for the 
intensity or striving for the goal once it is initiated. 
The present study is concerned primarily with the first question and 
represents an attempt to isolate the effects of differences in strength of 
expectancy and incentive on choice behavior. Also, an expectancy model 
(Tolman, 1959; Rotter, 1955; Edwards, 19..54; MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1953; 
and Vroom, 1964) and Festinger's (1957)' theory' of cognitive dissonance are 
used to generate predictions of choice behavior follOWing the experimental 
manipulation of probability of success, valence and failure at a task in 
a low investaent .situation. 
A.tkinson (1957. p. 360) definet expectancy as ••• "a cognitive anticip&-
tion usually aroused by cu~s in a situation, that perfonu.nce of some act 
will be followed by a particular consequence." He also defines incentive 
. 
(in the case of this paper valence) "as the relative attractiveness or a 
specific goal that is offered in a situation or the relative unattractiveness 
of an event that might occur as a consequence of some act." 
In his theory of the motivational determinants of risk taking behavior, 
Atkinson (1958) defines the strength of the motivation to perform an act 
3 
) 
to be a multiplicative function of the strength of the Motive (a disposition 
to strive for a certain kind of satisfaction). the expectancy that the act 
will have as a consequence the attailBent of an incentive,'and the value 
of the incentive (valence). However. Atkinson posits .xpectancy and inc.ntive 
to b. inTersly related to one another, i.... incentive (I) • l-P (expectancy). 
In this case the more difficult the task the aore attractive it is. 
Alternatively. Rosen (1961&) states that it is unclear what predictions 
can be generated by Atkinson's theory when determinants other than ditficulty 
contribute to the incentive value of success. The question therefore, arises 
as to what predictions can be aade about ~hoice behavior when there are 
already well established incentive values prior to obtaining information 
on which expectancies are based. 
Rosen (l96lb) states that occupat~onal preferenc.s are influenced by 
cultural values in addition to ttle ,pe'rceiv.d ,difticulty of t~ occupation 
and he demonstrated that val.nce and probability of success are directly 
related rather than inversely r.lat.d as d.scribed by Atkinson, i •••• it 
the probability of attaining a goal is d.creased the attractiveness of the 
goal is also decreased. 
Rosen had subjects list in order of preference a nUDlber of occupatioft8 
based not on what the subject wanted in terms of his int.rests but upon 
consid.rations such as salary and social standing or prestige value of eacb 
occupation. Following this Rosen had his subjects take a Differential 
Aptitude Test (~T) to determine the probability that the subject would be 
able to achieve his most preferred occupation. He then gave tbe subjects 
falsified DAT results which eitber indicated that the subject would have a 
4 
good or poor chance of achieving this occupation. He then had his subjects 
again order in terms of preference which occupations he preferred the most. 
Rosen found that when ,2s are given probability ratings for goals with high 
valence, those given low probability of success ratings were most likely 
to lower the valence of the goal. When.2s were given probability of success 
ratings for neutral valenced goals, those given high probability of success 
ratings were most likely to change the valence of the goal. In other words, 
there was an anchoring of attitudes only with high probability of success 
cognitions and highly valued goals or with low probability of success ratings 
and neutral goals. 
Rosen considers the choice among goals to be a joint function of the 
valence of the goal and the probability of attaining it. For a given valence, 
the strength of the motivation to aohiere the goal is a function of the 
probability and for a given probability of sUQcess the strength of the aot-
ivation~is a function of the valence. 
This is also in accordance with Vrooa (1964) who states that "the 
force on a person to perfor.. an act is a monotonically increasing function 
of the algebraic sua of the products of the valences of all outcomes and 
the strength of his expectancies that the act will be followed by the 
attainment of these outcoaes (p~ 18). 
Thus, it is apparent that an individual who chooses among altematiYes 
which involve uncertain outcomes. his behavior will be affected not only 
by his preferences among the alternatives but also by the degree to which 
he believes the outcomes to be probable (Tolman, Rotter, Edwards, Vroom. 
Rosen, MacCorquodale and Meehl). 
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Atkinson in a series of experiments has demonstrated that s subject 
is more willing to perform on a task when the incentive is $2.50 than when 
it is $1.25 no matter what the probability of winning providing the prob-
abilities are kept constant across both conditions. 
Edwards (1953, 19.54) has demonstrated that two factors are most im-
portant in determining choices: general preferences or dislikes for risk-
taking and specific preferences among probabilities. Subjects preferred 
low probabilities of losing large amounts of money to large probabilities 
of losing small amounts of money. He also found out that on positive ex-
, 
pected value bets, subjects ~re more willing to accept long shots when 
playing for real money than when just playing for worthless chips. In other 
words t when a subject can really use the incentive they are more willin& 
to take a chance and try for it than wnen they do not need it and cannot 
, ' 
utilize it for any purpose. This f£ftding W&1'just the reverse for negative 
expected value bets. 
fn the above experiments the incentive was money--an object whicb mOlt 
people do not have a surplus of. In both situations, (excluding the neg-
ative expected value situation), the subjects had nothing to lose--there 
was little investment. 
A question can now be raised as to what would happen in a low involve. 
ment situation involving an incentive based not on money but on an object 
in which there may be "consumer's surplus" (a phrase coined by Marshal, 1948), 
i.e., what will be the determinants of choice in a situation wbere there 
are subjects with high need and also those with low need. Will subjects' 
need be the predominating factor governing choice? Will valence of geal 
6 
and probability of success affect high and low need subjects differently? 
Based upon the findings of Atkinson and Edwards and Hosen, it is 
hypothesized that in a low investment situation: 1) choice of a task is 
based primarily on need; and 2) need will be more prominent in governing 
choice behavior in the absence of knowledge concerning probability of 
success than in its presence. 
There is also an interest in what effect failure to obtain a goal 
will have upon the desirability of the goal. 
Atkinson states that failure to obtain an easy goal will increase 
the desirability to obtain the goal for those subjects whose motive to 
achieve success (measured by the TAT) is greater than their motivation to 
avoid failure; and that failure to obtain a difficult goal will decrease 
the attractiveness of th& goal for these same subjects. 
On the other hand for those suQjects whose motivation to avoid failure 
,. . 
is greater than their motivation to achieve success, failure at an easy 
, 
task will cause the indivipual to seek an easier task and if he fails at 
the most difficult task he should stay with it. 
Such a theory, however. has no usefulness in generating predictions 
concerning those ~. whose motivation to approach success is equal to their 
motivation to avoid failure: nor is it of any use in generating predictions 
concerning randoml1 selected groups of ~s upon whom there are no TAT scores. 
Therefore, Vroom's expectancy theory and balance theories will be contrasted 
(Heider, 1944: Newcomb, 1953. Festinger. 1957). 
Balance theories predict that a discrepancy between two cognitions 
produces discomfort which results in a motivation to utilize dissonance 
reducing mechanisms. The degree to which dissonance-reducing mechaniSlls 
7 
are utilized is assumed to be a direct function of the discrepancy between 
the two cog~tions. 
If a subject with high need fails to obtain an attract1Tegoal aore 
dissonance should result if the probability of. obtaining the goal was high 
than' if it was low. As a result more high need subjects should decrease 
the attractiveness of the desired goal when the probability of obtaining 
it was high than when it was low. 
Expectancy theory on the other hand would predict just the opposite 
in that there will be a "salvage the process effect." Upon failing to 
attain a desired goal, probability will playa greater part in determining 
choice behavior than it did prior to failure, i.e., an! with. high need 
wUl stick with an easy task but shift for a difficult. HoweTer. an S with 
a low need is more flexible and will switch only if the alternative task 
is easy and not when it is difficul~~~., ' 
Method 
Subjects and Design.~~De hundred forty-seTen Introductory Psycholol1 
students attending Loyola University served as subjects in this study. Tbe 
general design was a 2 x 2 x 2 design in which subjects were given a choice 
of solving one ot three tasks. Each task hAd a different value--the subjects 
could receiYe 5, 2 or 1 laboratory points (they need 5 per seMster) tor 
successful cOlipletionof the task. 
Independent variables were: high or low probability ot solving the 
5 point task; b) the exper11llenter reporting the probability of solving each 
task before or after the subject had made his choice and c) the su~t·. 
" 
"need" for laboratory points, operationally defined high (needing 4 or 5 
8 
points) or low (needing I, 2. or J points). 
Dependent variables were: a) subject's initial choice of task, and b) 
subject's choice of task after failing to solve the initia1 task in the 
allotted time. 
Materials.--Three problem solving tasks were used in this study. 
The tasks were a) "wiggle blocks" which consisted of nine almost identical 
looking sub-blocks which if joined together in the appropriate way would 
form a cube; b) the Wais Object Block Design which consisted of nine separate 
cubes each of which had its sides painted either all red, all white, or 
half red and half white; and c) a sequence peg board with ten holes and 
nine pegs. 
Accompanying each problem solving task was one of three 4.x 6 inch 
index cards upon which was printed one Qf the three numbers 1, 2, or 5. 
The index cards indicating the wort.ti-of the task (in terms of experiaental 
points) were randomly placed with one of the three tasks prior to the ~ 
entering the experimental room. 
A stop-watch was used to indicate when the ~'s two minute problem 
solving period was up. 
Procedure.-...A.ll S's upon entering the experimental booth were seated 
at a table. Before each subject were the three problem solving tasks each 
with an accompanying number representing its worth to the subject in teras 
of experimental points. Expectancy of solving the most positively valent 
task (#5) was manipulated by stating to the ~ that his chances were .9. 
i.e., nine out of ten (high. probability of succeas)of solving,the task; 
or .2, i.e., two out of te~~(low probability of success) of solving the 
9 
task; (see Appendix I for complete transcript of the instructions for each 
condition). The probability of solving the tasks worth 1 and 2 points was 
held constant throughout the experiment at 1.00. 
All three tasks were capable of being solved but were sufficiently 
difficult that they could not be completed within a two minute tim. limit. 
Knowledge of the probabilities of solving the task was manipulated by 
either stating to the ~ the objective probabilities of solving the tasks 
before he made his decision (Choice condition) as to which task he wanted 
to solve or after he made his decision (~reference condition). 
After each ~ made his decision as to which task he wanted to work with 
(most and least) and after the probabilities of solving each task were 
explained to each ~. all ~s were given a two minute tiae interval to solve 
thei:i' task. 
~ince all tasks were sufficien~l.¥'difficuft that they would not be 
completed within the two minutes, at the end of theprobl •• solving period 
the ~s were told that they would be given one more chance to solTa the 
problem or one of the other problems. They were again allowed to make a 
decision as to which task they wanted to work with. In this wayan objective 
rating could be taken on the number of §.S wbo changed their tasks. 
Upon falling to solve a task the second time. the subjects were 
questioned about their thoughts and feelinia of the experiment. Following 
this the §.S were briefed about the true nature of the experiaent. 
Results 
At the conclusion of the experimental session. subjects were questioned 
regarding their need for experimental points in order to detel'lline the nuaber 
10 
of high and low need subjects in each of the four experimental treatments 
of C-C.9. C-C.2. P-C.9. and P-C.2. 
Table 1 reports the number of high and low need subjects in each of 
the four experimental treatments. 
Table 1 
Number of High and Low Need Subjects 
Treatment Category 
C-C.2 
Probability Given .2 
C.C.9 
Probability Given .9 
P-C.2 
Probability Not Given.2 
P-C.9 
Probability Not Given .9 
per Treatment Category 
High Need Subjects Low Need Subjects 
10 23 
14 19 
6 
I 
31 
20 21 
Four-celled chi-square tests indicate that there are no difference. 
between the C-C.2 and C-C.9 treatments in regards to the number of high 
need and low need subjects falli~ into each treatment on the ba.is ot 
need for experimental points (i'= 1.05. df .-1. N.S.). However. differences 
t,: 
between the P.C.2 and P-C.9 treatments were tested by four-celled chi-square 
tests and results indicate that significantly more high need subjects fell 
into the P-C.9 condition (X2 = 8.78,df.-l, p <.01). 
There were no differences bet'Ween-C-C and P-C treatments in regard. 
to the number of high and low need subjects falling into these overall 
treatment categories (X2 = .1448, df=l. N.S.) • 
. i~~ll 
This difference between the P-C.9 and P-C.2 treatment categories with 
respect to the number of high need subjects should be kept in mind when 
reading the following results. 
1s need a greater determinant of choice than probability in a low 
investment situation? The hypotheses predict that in a low investment 
situation, choice of a task is based primarily on need. Table 2 reports 
the initial choice of tasks as a function of probability. 
Table 2 
Initial Choice of Task as a Function ot 
, 
Need and Probability 
High Need Condition Low Heed Condition 
Task Choice Task Choice 
Treatment Categorl :2 1 or 2 :2 1 or 2 
C-~.2 ~~" ~ 26~ 7~ Probability GiTen .2 (J) , (6) (17) 
C-C.9 7~ ·2l~ 4~ ~ 
Probability Given .9 (11) (3) (8) (n) 
P-C.2 83~ l~ l~ 8l~ 
Probability Not Given .2 (5) (1) (6) (25) 
P-C.9 95~ 5~ l~ (~, Probability Not Given .9 (20) (1) (2) 
Note: Number in parentheses is N per cell. 
Differences within treatment categories with respect to the number 
of high need subjects initially choosing 5 and low need subjects initially 
choosing 1 or 2 were tested by four-celled chi-equare tests. 
High need subjects who had the probability 2i success given !2 ~ 
prior !2 their choice of task initially chose the task worth 5 points 
12 
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~ significantly more than low need subjects; also low need subjects who had 
t their probability of success given to them prior to their choice of task 
I initially chose a task worth 1 or 2 points instead of 5 points significantly 
I I more than the high need subjects (X2 = 10.615, df=l, p~.OOl). 
..• With respect to those treatment categories where the probability of 
I success ~ not given prior to making ~ initial choice, high need subjects 
'I chose the t~sk worth 5 points significantly more times than the tasks worth 
1 or 2 pOints and low need subjects initially chose a task worth 1 or 2 
t 
points significantly more times than the task worth 5 points (X2 = 40.691 
df=l, p<.OOl). Thus, it appears that need is a significant determinant 
of choice in a low investment situation. 
To determine if need is a greater determinant of choice than prob-
ability, differences with respect to the number of high need subjects 
initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in the probability given (.9) treatment 
and the probability given (.2) treatment were tested by means of four-celled 
cbi-square tests. Also. differences with respect to the number of ~ 
need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in the probability given (.9) 
treatment and the probability given (.2) treatment were tested by means 
of four-celled chi-square tests. The same tests were made for the prob-
ability not given (.9) and probability not given (.2) treatments. 
This method of utilizing four-chi-square tests (one for .high need, 
and one for low need subjects for each of the two major treatment categories) 
was chosen over utilizing two chi-square tests to determine differences 
with respect to the overall number of subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 
[
. in the probability given (.9) and the probability given (.2) treatment, as 
well as with respect to the overall number of subjects initially choosing 
13 
5 or 1 and 2 in the probability not given (.9) and (.2) treatments because 
of the problem involved in combining treatments having significantly 
~ifferent ~·s with regards to high need subjects. 
For the ~ where the probability of success i! given, there is no 
difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to the number 
2 
of high need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X = .2285. df.=l. 
N.S.). Also, there is no difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with 
respect to the number of low. need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 
(X2 = 1.114, df.-l. N.S.). Thus, it is apparent that need is a greater 
determinant of choice than probability in a low investment situation. 
For ~ ~ where the probability of success is .!!£!:. given. there 
is no difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to the number 
of high need subjects initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X2 a .728, df.~l. 
N.~.) nor with respect to the number o.f low need subjects initially choosing 
5 or 1 and 2 (X2 = .2984, df.=l, N.S.). 
Is need more of a determinant of choice when the probability of 
success is not given than when it is given? The hypotheses predict that 
need will be more prominent in governing choice behavior in the absence 
of knowledge concerning probability of success than in its presence. This 
is due to the fact that choice is based on need (valence) and probability 
(expectancy of attaining a goal). Data from table 2 are also' utilized to 
test this hypothesise 
Two separate analyses were performed--one for high need subjects 
and one for low need subjects. Again utilizing four-celled chi-square 
ltests the number of high need subjects in both C-C treatments initially 
14 
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! choosing 5 or 1 and 2 was compared to the number of high need subjects 
in both P-C treatments initially choosing 5 or 1 and 2. Results show 
that significantly more high need subjects initially choose 5 in the P-C 
2 
conditions (X = 2.78, df.=l, p. < .10). 
Also, the number of low need subjects in both C-C treatments in-
itially choosing 1 or 2 was compared to the number of low need subjects 
in both P-C treatments initially choosing 1 or 2. In this case, signifi-
cantly more low need subjects initially chose 1 or 2 in the P-C treatments 
(X2 = 3.414, df.=l, p<.lO). Thus, it appears that need is more a 
determinant of choice when probabilities are not known than when probabil-
ities are given. However, the difference is only marginally significant. 
What effect does failure at a task have upon the determinants of 
choice? Upon failure, is need a greater determinant of choice than prob-
ability or does probability have more weigth in governing choice? 
The hypotheses predict that upon failure, probability will playa 
greater part as a determinant of choice than it had prior to failure 
(need will not be as powerful a determinant of choice) however, the specific 
predictions generated from dissonance theory and expectancy theory differ 
in regards to the effect of failure. 
Dissonance theory predicts that if a high need subject fails to 
obtain an attractive goal more dissonance should result if the probability 
of obtaining the goal was high '(.9) than if it was low (.2), and as a re-
sult more high need subjects should decrease the attractiveness of the 
desired goal when the probability of obtaining it was high than when it 
was low. 
15 
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! On the basis of dissonance theory. then. fewer high need subjects 
I 
! 
j should choose 5 on the second trial within the .9 treatment conditions; i I within the .2 treatment conditions there should not be an oceurance of ! ,'issonance upon failure to attain the goal and just as many high need 
I ::b~:::: :::::: ::::::t:v:np:::.:::::: :;i::c::s:h:h~:1:~::::::.C::d:::on5. 
! 
i 
.9 conditions and stay the same in the .2 conditions such that there 
should be no difference between the number of high need subjects choosing 
5 in the .9 and .2 treatment categories. 
Decision theory or expectancy theory would predict that the effect 
of failure would result in more emphasis being put on probability per sa 
for the high need subjects, i.e., upon failure fewer high need subjects 
should pick 5 on the second trial in the .2 treatment categories than in 
the .9 treatment categories. The subjective probability of subjects should 
decrease in the .2 treatment such that the subject has a subjective prob-
ability or expectancy of success of less than .2. This should result in 
a "salvage the process" effect such that on the second trial there should 
be a greater number of high need subjects choosing 1 or 2 in the .2 treat-
ment categories. Table J reports the second choice of task by subjects 
as a function of need, probability and failure. 
To determine what effect failure had upon the determinants of choice, 
the number of high need subjects choosing 5 and 1 or 2 was compared to 
the number of low need subjects choosing 5 and 1 or 2 for the combined 
treatment categories in which the probability was initially given, i.e., 
for the combined C-C (.2) and C-C (.9) groups. This was also done for 
the combined P-C (.2) and P-C (.9) groups. 
16 
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! Table 3 
I Second Choice of Task as a Function of Need, Probability and Failure 
High Need Condition Low Need Condition 
Task Choice Task Choice 
Treatment Categorl 
.2 1 or 2 :2 1 or 2 
C-C .2 (J) (7) (4) (19) 
Probability given .2 30% 70% 17% 83% 
C-C .9 (10) (4) (8) (11) 
Probability given .9 71% 29% 42% 58% 
P-C .2 (J) (J) (J) (28) 
Probability Not Given .2 50% 50% 10% 90% 
P-C .9 (12) (9) (5) (16) 
i Probability Not Given .9 57% 43% 24% 76% 
Note: Number in parentheses is N per a~ll. 
Results indicate that for the C-C groups, significantly more high 
need subjects choose the task worth 5 points than low need subjects and 
that low need subjects choose the tasks worth I or 2 points (X2 = 4.25. 
df.=l. p<.05). Also for the P-C groups significantly more high need 
subjects choose the task worth 5 points and significantly more low need 
. 2 
subjects choose the tasks worth 1 or 2 points (X = 12.018, df.=l. p<.OOI). 
Thus, it appears that need still determines choice but not to' the extent 
that it had before failure was induced. 
To determine if need is a greater determinant of choice than 
probability on second choice, differences with respect to the number of 
high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 on the second trial in the 
17 
r'· 
probability given (.9) treatment and the probability given (.2) treat-
ment were tested by means of four-celled chi-square tests. Also. differences 
with respect to the number of low need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 in 
the probability given (.9) treatment and the probability given (.2) treat-
ment were tested by means of four-celled chi-square tests. The same tests 
were made for the probability not given (.9) and probability not given , 
(.2) treatments. 
f2! the ~ where the probability of success is given, the diff-
erence between the .9 and .2 condition with respect to the number of 
high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 results in a chi-square of 
2.536 (X2 = 2.536, df.=l, p<.2). hlso, the difference between the .9 
and .2 conditions with respect to the number of low need subjects choosirg 
5 or 1 and 2 results in a chi-square of 2.021 (X2 = 2.021, df.=l, p<.2). 
Thus, although there is not a significant difference between the high and 
low probability conditions, there is a trend for probability to playa 
more important p~rt in choice behavior after failure for those subjects 
who initially were given probabilities of success. 
!2! ~ £!!! where the probability ££ success is n£i given, there 
is clearly no difference between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to 
2 the number of high need subjects choosing 5 or 1 and 2 (X = .0241, df.=l, 
N.S.).nor with respect to the number of low need subjects choosing 5 
or 1 and 2 on the second trial (X2 = .988, df.=l. N.S.). 
Discussion I I Perhaps the most general stat::ent that can be ma6e about this I 
I_H_. _______________________________________________ , __ ~ 
'~~~UdY is that in a low investment situation need will be the primary deter-
minant. of choice of a goal among a set of alternative goals but that know-
leage of the probability of success in obtaining the goal will decrease 
the weight of need in governing choice behavior. 
According to decision making paradigms which state that choice of 
a goal among a set of alternatives is a multiplicative function of the 
valence of the goal and the probability of success in obtaining the goal 
; it was predicted that in a low investment situation need would be a sign-
ificant determinant of choice. Results indicate that high need subjects 
r10 in fact choose a goal which will meet their need (choosing a task worth 
5 points over a task worth 1 or 2 points) and that low need subjects choose 
a foal among a set of goals which will meet their need (choosing a task 
worth 1 or 2 points over a task worth 5 points). The differences between 
the number of high and low need subje~ts picking a task worth 5 points 
or 1 and 2 pOlnts was significant at the .001 level. thus supporting the 
hypothesis. A finding worthy to point out here is that in a situation 
in which there may be a "consumer surplus", the subject does not seek the 
surplus but bases his choice primarily on need. This is evidenced by 
the fact that low need subjects choose tasks worth 1 or 2 points signif-
icantly more times than they did a task worth 5 points in the experimental 
treatment category where the subject did not know the probabilities of 
success prior to making his choice (X2 = 40.691, df.=l. p<.OOl). 
Concerning whether neea is a greater determinant of choice than 
probability of success in a low investment situation, results indicate 
Uat in the treatment categories where the probability of success was given 
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r:::or to the subject making a choice there was no significant difference 
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t between the .9 probability of success condition and the .2 probability of 
success condition with respect to the number of high need subjects choosing 
a task worth 5 points and the number of low need subjects choosing a task 
worth 1 or 2 points, thus supporting the hypothesis that in a low investment 
, situation need will be greater determinant of choice than probability of 
success. 
Since most theories of individual decision making emphasize a mul-
tiplicative function of valence of goal (based on subject's need in the 
case of tC1is experiment) and probability of success in attaining the goal, 
it follows that if the valence of all goals among a set of alternative 
goals are equal, choice of one goal among the set of alternatives will be 
based on the probability of success of attaining each of the alternatives. 
Also, if the probabilities of success for each goal are kept constant, 
choice of one goal among a set of alternatives should be based on the 
valence of each respective goal. Such was the case as stated above when 
high need subjects choose 5 and low need subjects choose 1 or 2 in the 
probability not given treatments. 
Following from this finding, however, it was predicted that there 
should be a difference between the probability of success given treatment 
and probability of success not given treatment, i.e., the subjects in the 
probability not given treatment should base their decision on need and the 
subjects in the probability given treatment should base their decision 
on both valence of the goals and the probability of success of each goal 
such that more high need subjects should choose 5 in the probability of 
success not given treatment than in the probability of success given 
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1 treatment and more low need su~jects should choose 1 or 2 in the prob-
I 
ability of success not given treatment than in the probability of success 
given treatment. Marginal sUh,ort in the fredicted direction was given to 
these two hypotrieses in that the differences between the two treatment 
categories with respect to high need subjects choosing 5 resulted in a chi-
square of 2.78 (X2 = 2.78, df.=l, p<.lO), and the difference between the 
two treatment categories with respect to low need subjects resulted in a 
2 
chi-square of ).414 eX = ).414, df.=l, p<:.lO). 
The fact that only marginal significance was obtained may be explained 
by the fact that the subjects were in a low investment situation. The 
subjects are required to obtain 5 experimental points by participating 
in psychology experiments through the course of a semester. Usually, a 
subject will get only 1 experimental point for 1 hour of participation. 
however, it had been made known to all subjects that the length of this 
particluar experiment was only 15 minutes and that it was possible to 
obtain all the necessary experimental points for a semester in the course 
of 15 minutes. 
Knowing this it is feasible to assume that the subjects in the 
probability given treatment would be willing to gamble 15 minutes time in 
order to obtain his required number of experimental points and thereby 
disregard somewhat the probability of success attached to each task. 
The effect of experimentally induced failure upon the determinants 
~f choice is not totally clear. Need is still a powerful determinant of 
choice as evidenced by the fact that in the probability given treatment, 
high need subjects choose the task worth 5 points significantly more times 
21 
r·:han the low need subjects (X2 = 4.25, df.=l, p<.05). This same finding 
1 holds true for the probability not given treatment (X2 = 12.018. df.=l, 
P<' .001). It is to be noted. however. that the obtained chi-square values 
, for both major treatment categories are much smaller than the same c.hi-
2 2 
square obtained prior to failure (X = 10.615. p~.OOl and X = 40.691. 
df.=l, p<'.OOl respectively). 
Does this mean that need is not as great a determinant of choice 
after failure and that more recognition and weight is given to the prob-
abilities involved? The hypotheses predict both in the case of dissonance 
theory and expectancy theory that probability will playa greater part as 
a determinant of choice after failure than it had prior to failure. however, 
the specific predictions generated from dissonance and expectancy theories 
ciffer. 
According to dissonance theory. it was predicted that fewer high 
need subjects should choose 5 after failure in the .9 treatments due to 
the dissonance resulting between the two incompatible cognitions of "I 
need the 5 points." and "I failed to obtain the 5 pOints even though I 
had a high probability of obtaining them." however. with regard to the 
.2 treatment conditions. dissonance should not result because the two 
cognitions of "I failed to get the needed points" and "the probability of 
getting the needed points was low" are consonant. As a result just as 
many subjects should pick the same alternative in the .2 condition. 
Therefore. dissonance theory predicts more recognition will be 
given to the probability of success after failure but due to the prediction 
of a decrease of subjects choosing 5 in the .9 condition after failure 
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r· and no .difference in the number of subjects choosing 5 in the .2 condition, 
the effect of probability will be obscured in determining whether prob-
I ! ability was given more weight in the decision after failure. However, 
mere inspection of the number of high need subjects choosing 5 in the .9 
and .2 conditions before and after failure indicates that this prediction 
is not supported. 
Decision theory predicted that upon failure those subjects with 
high need picking 5 in the .2 conditions would try and "salvage" what they 
can from the experiment when given a second chance and therefore would 
place more weight on the probabilities such that there would be a difference 
between the .9 and .2 conditions with respect to the number of high need 
subjects picking 5 after failure and the number of low need subjects picking 
1 or 2. AlthouBh this hypothesis was not supported with respect to either 
of the major treatment categories, there was a trend in the probability 
given treatment category for more weight or emphasis being put on probability 
in determining choice. The difference between the number of high need 
subjects picking 5 in the .9 and .2 probability given treatment resulted 
in X2 = 2.536, df.=l, p<.2 and for low need subjects was X2 = 2.021, 
df.=l, p<:.2. 
This trend was not found in the probability not given treatment 
category. The fact that the trend was found in the probability given 
treatment but not in the probability not given treatment cannot be explained 
at this point and is one of the limitations of this study. 
The fact that the trend was found in the probability given condition 
but was not significant can again be explained by the fact that the subject 
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was in a low investment situation and had so to speak "nothing to loose" 
by disregarding probability of success. 
Finally, it should be noted that the findings of this study are 
in essential agreement with those found in other studies. 
The finding that need is a determinant of choice of a goal among 
a set of alternatives as well as knowledge concerning probability of 
success in attaining alternative goals is in accord with the theoretical 
work of Tolman (1959), Rotter (1955), Edwards (1954) and Vroom (1964) 
and imparts a certain amount of empirical support to their contention 
that there are two determinants of choice in a situation involving al-
ternative sets of goals--namely, the valence of each goal as well as the 
probability of attaining it. The findings also provide a basis for 
determining which factor, valence of goal or probability of attaining it, 
should be given most emphasis in a low investment situation. Finally. 
the findings concerning the effects of failure on the determinants of 
choice suggest that more emphasis is given to the probability of success 
factor after failure to attain a goal, but due to the inconclusive evidence 
at this point, this finding is highly tenative. 
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Appendix I 
Background of Experiment Explained to the Subject 
and 
Instructions Read to the Subject 
Did you take the questionnaire administered on the first day of 
Class? (Every semester on the first day of class all Introductory Psych-
ology students take the Walker-Nicolay Personal Reaction Schedule). The 
students were then told, the reason I ask is that this experiment is con-
cerned with two of the four scales built into the questionnaire and each 
scale respectively measures if the student is high, medium or low anxious 
and high, medium or low motivated. 
The interest in these two particular scales is as follows: the 
graduate department in 'psychology here at Loyola as well as at Northwestern 
and the University of Chicago often times have their graduate students 
serve internships or clerkships at the Research Veteran's Hospital on the 
south side of the city or at Kines V.A. in Maywood. 
Often times the men on the staff of these institutions ask us in 
turn to run a study for them in our respective universities. The purpose 
of our running the studies is to establish a base rate of performance for 
a task on a "normal" population so that these men may in turn use this 
b~se rate of performance to compare with it the performance level of the 
men within their respective institutions. 
Currently there are a l~rge number of young men (19-22 years old) 
being placed within one of these two hospitals. 
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r--------;hese men are there as a result of their war experiences in Viet I Nam and they have been disabled in some manner or formi for example loss 
of limb. As a result of their W3.r experiences or as a result of their 
injuries these men are either very high anxious or very low motivated. 
What the hospital staff wants to know is if there is any relation-
ship or correlation between anxiety and motivation and ability to perform 
on tasks involving spatial orientation or manipulative ability or manuel 
dexterity_ 
The hospital staff has not made any predictions or hypotheses but 
are currently interested in establishing a base rate of performance. They 
have therefore, given me a standardized set of instructions to read to you. 
I cannot deviate from these instructions and I cannot answer any questions 
so you will have to listen very closely. 
Since the instructions for this experiment are standardized, there 
will be no questions. The purpose of this experiment is to determine if 
there are any correlations between two scales on the PRS questionnaire 
and the wais Object Assembly test which is designed basically as a man-
ipulatory test. 
You see before you three Wais Object Assembly tasks each of which 
has a number beside it. This number represents the number of points you 
will receive for this experiment if you pick that particular task. For 
example, if you choose task 1 you will receive one point for the experiment 
and if you choose task 2 you will get two points for the experiment and 
if you choose task 5 you will get 5 points for the experiment. 
Usually Loyola only gives one point for one hour of participation 
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in an experiment or for a fraction of an hour. Sometimes a student will 
get two points but this will depend on the length of the experiment--
usually it is two hours long. 
The length of this experiment is only about twenty minutes, however, 
we have permission to give up to five points for the experiment, but this 
will depend upon the individual subject. 
Choice-Condition.--Before you make your choice as to which puzzle 
you want to work with I must first tell ~ou that task 1 and 2 have an 
absolute certainty of being solved, however, tbe probability of obtaining 
the solution to task 5 is .9 (.2 in the low expectancy condition), that 
is, 9 out of 10 people usually solve task 5 (or only 2 out of 10 usually 
solve task 5). 
One other thing I must tell you before you make your choice is 
that !!2. matter wtlich .!:!!!. you choose, should you fail to solve your task 
within a two minute time limit you will not receive any points for the 
experiment. The reason for this is two-fold: (1) we have set up our design 
in such a way that in order for us to make our correlations we need a 
completed task within two minutes or less--anything over two minutes we 
will not be able to use and you would be wasting your time as well as ours. 
(2) Secondly, we are interested in motivation and we hope that this in 
turn will motivate you to complete your task within a given two minute 
time limit. 
Now out of the three tasks which would you prefer most to work 
with? Least? 
At the end of the two minute task period the subject was told, 
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(first name of subject), you did not complete your task. We cannot 
use the information because we need a completed task from beginning to end. 
If I were to ask you to leave now, you will not get any points and we 
won't be able to use your data. As an absolute, I will give you one more 
two minute time limit to give us a completed task. If you fail to solve 
a task then, I will have to ask you to leave for sure. Within the next 
two minutes you may continue to work on your same task or you may pick 
one of the other two. If you choose to keep working on your same task, 
I will have to take apart anything you may have done because we need a 
completed task from start to end. Now again, which task would you prefer 
most to work with and which least? 
Preference Condition.--The introduction and background given to 
the subjects in this condition were the same as above with the exception 
of the time in the instructions in which the probabilities of solving 
each task were given to the subject. Following the introduction to the 
experiment, the subjects in this condition were told, one other thing 
I must tell you before you make your choice is that n£ matter which ~ 
you choose, should you fail to solve your task within a two minute time 
limit you will not receive any points for the experiment. The reason for 
this is two-fold: (1) we have set up our design in such a way that in 
order for us to make our correlations we need a completed task within 
two minutes or less--anything over two minutes we will not be able to use 
and you would be wasting your time as well as ours. (2) Secondly, we are 
interested in motivation and we hope that this in turn will motivate you 
J to complete your tasks with a given given two minute time limit. 
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r .... ~ ... · I Now out of the three tasks which would you prefer most to work 
I 
f with? Least? 
I After the subject made his decision as to which task he wanted to I work with he was then told, 1 can now tell you that task 5 has •• 9 
(.2 in the low expectancy condition) probability of being solved, that is 
9 out of 10 people (2 out of 10 people in the low expectancy condition) 
usually solve this task within the given two minute time limit. Task 1 
and 2 respectively have an absolute certainty of being solved. 
The instructions following the failure to solve the task within 
the two minute time limit were the same as in the Choice condition. 
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